By Alan Lolaev, visiting researcher at the Laboratory for Political Geography and Contemporary Geopolitics, Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

US policy towards Russia and Ukraine has always been one of the most significant and controversial aspects of American diplomacy. In 2016, Donald Trump, still a presidential candidate at the time, actively expressed his desire to normalize relations with Russia. However, these plans faced strong opposition, particularly from the outgoing administration of Barack Obama. 

This historical context illustrates how incumbent authorities can use a transitional period to solidify their policies, complicating their successor’s ability to make changes. Now, as Trump declares his intention to resolve the conflict in Ukraine “within 24 hours” after returning to the White House, he faces significant obstacles from the current administration of Joe Biden, which can use the remaining time until January 2025 to entrench its current course.

After Donald Trump won the presidential election in November 2016, the Obama administration took several steps that significantly complicated the new president’s plans to normalize relations with Russia. During his campaign, Trump had emphasized the need for rapprochement with Moscow and revising America’s hardline foreign policy. However, Obama’s actions during the transition period, between November 2016 and Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, aimed to solidify the anti-Russian course, making such changes difficult. These steps created a kind of “legacy” that was politically and strategically challenging for Trump to alter. As a result, much of his rhetoric about rapprochement with Russia remained unrealized.

One of the key moves was diplomatic escalation. In December 2016, the Obama administration introduced a new package of sanctions against Russia, citing allegations of cyberattacks on the US Democratic Party and interference in the American elections. These sanctions included freezing the assets of Russian organizations and restrictions on business contacts. Simultaneously, 35 Russian diplomats were expelled from the US, and two diplomatic facilities were closed, which, according to Washington, had been used for intelligence activities.

Alongside the sanctions, the Obama administration actively promoted the narrative of Russian election interference in the public domain. Official statements from high-ranking officials, intelligence reports, and numerous media appearances painted Russia as a threat to American democracy. A significant element of this campaign was the transfer of extensive documentation to Congress and intelligence agencies, which, according to Obama and his team, confirmed Russian meddling. This made the “Russian threat” a central theme in political and public discourse, significantly restricting Trump’s flexibility in relations with the Kremlin. Any attempts by the new president to pursue rapprochement could be interpreted as undermining national security or even as supporting Moscow’s “hostile actions.” 

During this period, Obama also increased support for Ukraine, providing additional financial and political resources. This reinforced a foreign policy line aimed at countering Russia in Eastern Europe. This move symbolized a commitment to a hardline approach, which involved containing Moscow by supporting its adversaries. Furthermore, the Obama administration strengthened relations with NATO allies, emphasizing a commitment to collective security. This created additional barriers to any future policy changes, as any deviation from the hardline course could be seen as a weakening of US commitments to its partners. 

Special attention was given to creating political pressure on Trump himself. The Obama administration directly or indirectly supported investigations into possible connections between Trump’s team and Russia. This issue was widely discussed in the media, shaping the image of the new president as a politician whose actions might be influenced by foreign interests. This environment made any rapprochement steps with Moscow extremely risky for Trump in terms of domestic political competition.

Overall, the Obama administration’s actions during the transition period were strategic and aimed at institutionalizing a tough anti-Russian policy. New sanctions, diplomatic measures, increased support for Ukraine, and promoting the “Russian threat” narrative created a barrier to any policy shifts. Even if Trump was willing to reconsider relations with Russia, he faced significant constraints on both the foreign policy and domestic fronts. The political, media, and institutional atmosphere created by Obama effectively deprived the new president of the ability to swiftly implement his plans to normalize US-Russia relations. This example shows how an outgoing administration can use the transition period to reinforce its legacy and limit the successor’s actions.

Now, in 2024, with Trump once again having won the presidential election, his stated goals of quickly de-escalating the conflict in Ukraine face the potential for strong resistance from the incumbent administration. Biden can take several steps to minimize Trump’s chances of implementing his foreign policy ambitions.

First, the Biden administration can increase military aid to Ukraine by accelerating arms deliveries and signing long-term contracts. Washington is already providing Kiev with a wide range of weapons systems, including advanced equipment such as air defense systems and long-range missiles. Long-term agreements for such supplies would ensure continued military support for Ukraine, even if Trump attempts to halt it after his inauguration. An initial step in this direction was granting permission for Ukrainian forces to use American weapons for strikes on Russian territory, specifically in Kursk Region.

Second, financial support for Kiev could be increased through large aid packages. Such an approach would enable the Ukrainian government to continue functioning and conduct military operations even if the new administration decides to reduce aid. These tranches could be legally structured in a way that their cancellation would require a complicated approval process by Congress, making it more difficult for Trump to act in this direction.

A third possible step involves concluding political agreements with key US allies in Europe. Biden can strengthen coordination with NATO and EU countries, including long-term commitments to supporting Ukraine. These agreements would not only enhance EU involvement in the conflict but also create additional pressure on Trump if he attempts to revise the course. Reneging on such commitments could be perceived by allies as undermining US dedication to collective security.

A fourth tool for the Biden administration is tightening the sanctions regime against Russia. Imposing additional sanctions at the end of Biden’s term could complicate their subsequent reversal, as this would require a complex process involving congressional approval. Moreover, introducing new sanctions before Biden’s departure would cement the current strategy of pressure on Russia and make abandoning it a politically risky move for Trump.

Finally, the Biden administration could intensify the public promotion of the idea that supporting Ukraine is critically important for US national security. Leveraging such arguments in the public sphere, particularly through media and political campaigns, would create additional pressure on Trump. Abandoning support for Ukraine could be portrayed as a threat to US interests, complicating course changes.

The history of US administrative confrontations shows that outgoing leadership can significantly influence their successor’s policies. Donald Trump experienced this in 2016, and it is highly likely that history will repeat itself in 2024. Joe Biden, with powerful leverage, can entrench the current US policy towards Ukraine, making any abrupt changes after Trump’s inauguration more challenging. These actions risk not only prolonging the conflict but also intensifying internal political strife in the United States.